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Abstract: This paper discusses Leibniz’s view and defence of heliocentrism, which was one of the 
main achievements of the Scientific Revolution (1543-1687). As Leibniz was a defender of a strictly 
mechanistic worldview, it seems natural to assume that he accepted Copernican heliocentrism and 
its completion by figures like Kepler, Descartes and Newton without reservation. However, the fact 
that Leibniz speaks of the Copernican theory as a hypothesis (or plausible assumption) suggests that 
he had several reservations regarding heliocentrism. On a first approach Leibniz employed two of his 
most cherished principles to defend the Copernican hypothesis against the proponents of 
geocentrism: these were the principle of the relativity of motion and the principle of the equivalence 
of hypotheses. A closer analysis reveals, however, that Leibniz also appeals to dynamic causes of 
planetary motions, and these constitute a much stronger support for heliocentrism than his two 
philosophical principles alone. 
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1. Introduction 
Like many of Newton’s contemporaries – R. Boyle (1627-91); P.L. Moreau de Maupertius, 
(1698-1759) –, G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) was a believer in the mechanical worldview: a 
clockwork universe. I. Newton (1643-1727) still believed that the clockwork universe needed 
occasional adjustments – corrective interferences – on the part of the ‘Artificer’, making 
God a supreme engineer. But both Boyle and Leibniz saw the need for occasional repair 
work as a diminution of the power of the supernatural agent. Once the clockwork was set in 
motion by its divine author, the universal laws took over and kept it in reliable order. Leibniz 
holds that nature is subject to the laws of nature: 
The natural forces of bodies are all subject to ‘mechanical laws’. (Leibniz 1715-16, Fifth 
Paper, Section 124, 237-38) 
I consider it sufficient that the mechanism of the world is built with such wisdom that these 
wonderful things depend upon the progression of the machine itself (…). (Leibniz 1698, 499)1 
It is therefore natural to assume that Leibniz accepted Copernican heliocentrism, and its 
completion by figures like J. Kepler (1571-1630), R. Descartes (1596-1650) and I. Newton, 
without reservation. With the discovery and mathematical formulation of his three laws of 
planetary motion, Kepler had placed heliocentrism on a more secure footing than 
Copernicus’s original version. In his Tentamen de motuum coelestium (1689), Leibniz 
showed himself to be fully aware of Kepler’s achievements and proposed a mechanical 
theory to ‘explain the causes of celestial motions’. In an assessment of the Leibnizian 
defence of heliocentrism it is therefore important to be aware of the development of the 
Copernican hypothesis from its originator through Kepler and Galileo to Newton.  
On a first approach it looks, however, as if Leibniz’s endorsement of heliocentrism was 
hedged by several reservations. (Cf. Finocchiaro 2005,Chapt. 5; Meli 1988) 1) On the 
scientific level, Leibniz continues to speak of heliocentrism in the Copernican manner as a 
hypothesis, even though the term had acquired a negative connotation at the hands of 
figures like Kepler and Newton. 2) On the political level, Leibniz shared Galileo’s concern 
that the anti-Copernican censure of the Catholic Church could do serious harm to scientific 
                                                          
1
The fact that Leibniz also held that the principles of mechanics were metaphysical principles does not change 
his commitment to the mechanical universe, since the mechanical laws can be derived from the metaphysical 
principles: ‘everything happens mechanically in nature but the principles of mechanics are metaphysical.’ (See 
Leibniz 1690a, 245; Leibniz 1695, 441; Leibniz 1710-6,  399; Antognazza 2003; Garber 1995) 
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progress and threaten its recent achievements. 3) On the philosophical level, Leibniz 
nevertheless offered a guarded defence of heliocentrism. He declared it more ‘intelligible’ 
than its rival – Ptolemaic geocentrism. He employed two of his most cherished philosophical 
principles to defend heliocentrism against the proponents of geocentrism. These were the 
principles of the relativity of motion and of the equivalence of hypotheses. Closer analysis 
shows, however, that Leibniz also advanced dynamic reasons, which offered stronger 
support in favour of Copernicanism than his two philosophical principles alone.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyse how these considerations led Leibniz to a balanced 
approach to this still hotly debated topic of his day. Leibniz’s defence cleverly steers its way 
between support for heliocentrism and avoidance of its condemnation by the Censors. It 
will be helpful to offer the reader a brief summary of Copernicus’s achievements and to 
describe the changes in connotation, which the term ‘hypothesis’ underwent during the 
course of the 16th and 17th centuries: from an educated conjecture for Copernicus to a 
‘gratuitous’ fiction for Newton. These changes in connotation reflect the development of 
heliocentrism during the course of the 16th and 17th centuries. 
2. A Summary of Heliocentrism 
For readers unfamiliar with the astronomical theory of Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543), it 
may be useful to remind them of some of his achievements. In a departure from a long 
tradition, which had its roots in Greek thought, Copernicus proposed a heliocentric – sun-
centred – view of the universe, in opposition to the established geocentric – Earth-centred -
view, whose chief proponents were Aristotle (354-322 BC) and Ptolemy (100-175 AD). 
Copernicus made the Earth a planet, which orbited the central (mean) sun. To place the sun 
at the centre of the then known universe was not in itself an original idea. The Greek 
astronomer Aristarchus of Samos (çirca 310-230 BC) had already constructed a heliocentric 
world system, which made the Earth rotate daily on its own axis and annually around the 
sun. The diurnal rotation of the Earth was proposed by several thinkers throughout the ages 
(Herakleides, Buridan, Oresme, Nicolas of Cusa). But no technical details of Aristarchus’s 
system have survived so that Copernicus became the first known astronomer to construct a 
coherent, mathematical system of planetary motion from a heliocentric perspective. In the 
Greek geocentric tradition all the planets and their motions were treated separately but 
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Copernicus’s aim was to derive all the observational data of the planets’ orbits from the 
assumption of a moving Earth. Thus Copernicus became the first astronomer to propose a 
detailed account of the astronomical consequences of the Earth’s motion, as part of a 
planetary system. (Kuhn 1957, 142-4; Weinert 2009, §3.1) It is important to observe that 
although Copernicus reports his own observations of the sky, these observations do not 
reach beyond the discoveries of his Greek predecessors. He does not discover new facts 
about the planets. It is equally important to realize that Copernicus still adheres to much of 
the Greek tradition in his mathematical techniques. Like his illustrious Greek predecessors, 
Aristotle and Ptolemy, he uses geometry to describe the motions of the then known 6 
planets. Most importantly, Copernicus does not abandon the fundamental Greek idea that 
all celestial objects must move in circles around a central body, since the circle was 
considered to be the most perfect geometric figure. Perfection and harmony, to the Greek 
mind, characterized the heavens.  
Given these few rudimentary facts about the Copernican system, especially his profound 
indebtedness to the Greek tradition, the obvious question, which many historians of science 
have asked, is whether the Copernican model constitutes a scientific revolution. The epithet 
‘Copernican revolution’ is sometimes bestowed on the whole period from the publication of 
the Copernican treatise (1543) to the publication of Newton’s Principia (1687) and 
sometimes on the Copernican theory itself. In the present context the question is only 
whether the Copernican theory itself is revolutionary, since there is little disagreement that 
the period from Copernicus to Newton constitutes indeed a scientific revolution. When 
Leibniz took up his defence of heliocentrism, he had the whole development of 
heliocentrism in mind. Answers to this question help to understand the whole extent of the 
Copernican revolution. Historical judgements on this question have therefore varied widely. 
The historian of science De Solla Price saw in Copernicus’s book ‘little more than a 
reshuffled version of [Ptolemy’s] Almagest’. (De Solla Price 1962, 215)  Arthur Koestler also 
detected little originality in Copernicus, characterizing him as a ‘stuffy pedant’, but also 
recognized in him a ‘crystallizer of thought’. (Koestler 1964, 205, 113) E. Rosen found that 
‘Copernicus did not foment a “Copernican Revolution”’ (Rosen 1984, 132-3), whilst for A. C. 
Crombie (1961, 168) the Copernican Revolution consisted in the link Copernicus established 
between the diurnal and annual revolution of the Earth and the motion of the planets. J. H. 
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Randall (1962, 308-15) was more willing to grant Copernicus the title of a scientific 
revolutionary, whilst H. Blumenberg (1955; 1965) acknowledged Copernicus above all as an 
intellectual reformer. Similarly, for O. Gingerich, Copernicus was a ‘sensitive visionary who 
precipitated a scientific revolution.’ (Gingerich 1993, 201) 
Thomas S. Kuhn is best known for his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (11962), 
which characterizes numerous brief episodes in the history of science, including Copernican 
heliocentrism, as ‘revolutionary’ periods. But Kuhn’s most elaborate exploration of a 
scientific revolution is provided by the masterly analysis in his earlier book The Copernican 
Revolution (1957). In this book, Kuhn describes Copernicus as a precursor of a scientific 
revolution. His book De Revolutionibus (1543) is a ‘revolution-making rather than a 
revolutionary text.’ (Kuhn 1957, 183) 
Kuhn’s most careful investigation of a scientific revolution is to be found in his analysis of 
the early history of astronomy from the Greeks to Newton. In the book The Copernican 
Revolution (1957) Kuhn goes beyond the assessments of de Solla Price and Koestler and 
agrees with O. Gingerich that Copernicus is best described as a precursor of a scientific 
revolution. Unlike Rosen he sees in Copernicus’s book De Revolutionibus (1543) a 
‘revolution-making rather than a revolutionary text.’ (Kuhn 1957, 183) The Copernican 
system has aesthetic advantages, since it derives from the principle of a moving Earth a 
natural explanation of one of the gross planetary irregularities in Greek astronomy: the 
apparent retrograde (westward) motion of planets becomes a matter of the perspective of 
an Earth-bound observer who assesses the motion of planets around the sun against the 
background of the fixed stars. (Figure II) Although Copernicus abides by the Greek notion of 
uniform circular motion, he departs from Ptolemy by adopting a simple ‘distance-period’ 
relationship to assess the relative distances of the planets from the sun. The rule states that 
the further a planet is away from the sun, the longer is its orbital period. But Copernicus 
produced no decisive evidence, which could demonstrate that a Copernican hypothesis is 
more probable than a geocentric hypothesis. However, Kuhn’s tone changes in Structure, 
where he states, in many passages, that the replacement of Aristotelian-Ptolemaic 
geocentrism by Copernican heliocentrism is a paragon of a scientific revolution.  Copernicus 
is discussed in the same breath as Newton, Lavoisier and Einstein and is hailed as the 
originator of a new paradigm. (Kuhn 1970, 6, 66, 92, 116, 180, 200) 
 
6 
 
In order to appreciate the problem situation, which Leibniz faced, the question arises 
whether the Copernican model of 1543 was a scientific revolution or a precursor to a 
scientific revolution – two aspects of Kuhn’s assessment of the situation. The answer to this 
question depends on the criteria adopted but, crucially, the criteria themselves must be 
adequate for a historical judgement of a particular episode, like the Copernican heliocentric 
model. To appreciate the reasons why the Copernican hypothesis does not amount to a 
scientific revolution, it will be helpful to add some further historical material regarding the 
Copernican model. It has already been mentioned that Copernicus’s commitment to circular 
orbits and geometry marks a significant element of continuity between his work and that of 
his Greek predecessors. But there is also a significant element of discontinuity, hinted at by 
Crombie, which has not been sufficiently emphasized in the literature. Copernicus becomes 
the first astronomer to successfully treat the planets and the sun as a coherent system. As a 
cosmologist Aristotle had provided a qualitative model of the whole cosmos, consisting of 
two spheres. The supralunary sphere extended from the moon to the ‘fixed’ stars and was 
characterized by harmony, immutability, perfection and symmetry. As it was the realm of 
planetary orbits, the only possible trajectory for planets was the circle, since the circle was 
the most perfect geometric figure. The sublunary sphere extended from the (central) Earth 
to the moon and was characterized by imperfection, flux and change. As an astronomer 
Aristotle had proposed a concentric model of planetary motion according to which the 
planets were carried around the central Earth on homocentric shells, which consisted of a 
fifth element, called the ether. This planetary model was bound to be a failure because it 
could not account for the ‘appearances’: as the Greeks knew, planets do not keep the same 
distance from the ‘centre’ and consequently astronomers observe a change in brightness. 
Ptolemy, the mathematical astronomer, accepted Aristotle’s cosmological principles – 
especially the centrality of a stationary Earth – but, for computational reasons, treated each 
planet separately and in isolation from each other. Furthermore, Ptolemy introduced a 
number of geometric devices – in particular epicycles, eccentrics and equants (see Figures I-
III) – to bring the geocentric model in closer agreement with the ‘appearances’ (i.e. the 
known observable planetary orbits).  
Copernicus departs from the mathematical treatment of individual celestial objects. Instead 
he binds the planets into a coherent system, with the sun at the ‘centre’, such that the 
 
7 
 
removal or displacement of one element would disrupt the entire system. Such a 
commitment imposes an important constraint on the model, which became a permanent 
feature of astronomical model-building. 
And so, having laid down the movements which I attribute to the Earth farther on in the work, 
I finally discovered by the help of long and numerous observations that if the movements of 
the other wandering stars are correlated with the circular movement of the Earth, and if the 
movements are computed in accordance with the revolution of each planet, not only do all 
their phenomena follow from that but also this correlation binds together so closely the order 
and magnitudes of all the planets and of their spheres or orbital circles and the heavens 
themselves that nothing can be shifted around in any part of them without disrupting the 
remaining parts and the universe as a whole. (Copernicus 1543, 6)  
The conception of the coherence of planetary phenomena obliges the Copernicans to build 
a model of the planetary system, which must accommodate all the known empirical data. 
They were not altogether successful but the balance of successes and failures of the 
Copernican system provides useful indicators as to the criteria of scientific revolutions. 
Given these main lines of continuity and discontinuity it may be best to characterize 
Copernicus’s work as a Copernican turn: a change in perspective but not a revolution, in line 
with Kuhn’s original 1957 verdict.  
Let us briefly consider why the original Copernican position falls short of a scientific 
revolution and review some of the main reasons why many historians of science tend to 
withhold the status of a scientific revolution from the Copernican heliocentric model. 
 Although Copernicus was a ‘realist’ regarding the physical distribution and order of the 
planets in the sky, he accepts the ‘equipollence of hypotheses’, a philosophical device 
which can already be found in Ptolemy’s Almagest. It is also employed by Leibniz in his 
assessment of the Copernican turn.  This device encourages the acceptance of different 
geometric techniques, which are regarded as equivalent for the purpose of describing 
planetary motions. Two devices – one based on the eccentric circle (Figure I) and the 
other based on the epicyclic circle (Figure II) – were of particular importance for the 
geometric modelling of the apparent motions of the planets, as seen from the 
assumption of a stationary or rotating Earth. Note that a planetary system, of the 
Ptolemaic or Copernican flavour, faces two observational anomalies, which it must 
explain. One is the apparent non-uniform motion of the planets around the ‘centre’, i.e. 
the known fact that the planets do not travel around the centre at a uniform speed, 
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contrary to both the Ptolemaic and Copernican assumptions of the uniform circular 
motion of the planets around either the central Earth or the central sun. Ptolemy solved 
this problem by the employment of the eccentric circle. (Figure I)Despite his heliocentric 
hypothesis, Copernicus also still required small epicycles and eccentrics for his 
geometric constructions because he did not abandon the Greek ideal of circular motion. 
The second anomaly was the apparent retrograde motion of planets, as seen from the 
Earth. All planets move from west to east around the ‘centre’ but at certain periods they 
seem to reverse their motion (Figure II) and appear to move temporarily from west to 
east, as measured against the ‘fixed’ stars. In the Copernican model the retrogression is 
satisfactorily explained through the distance-period relationship. The Earth, being closer 
to the sun than, say, Mars overtakes Mars in its annual journey around the sun, which 
creates the impression that Mars temporarily retrogrades. Leibniz cites this natural 
explanation as one of the advantages of the Copernican system. Ptolemy solved the 
problem by the device of epicyclic motion. (Figure II)  
Copernicus regards the employment of both eccentric and epicyclic circles as equivalent 
techniques – both can be used to model planetary motion. (Copernicus 1543, Bk. III, 
§20, Bk. IV, §4) The Copernican indifference towards different geometric techniques 
shows that he is content with the Greek ideal of ‘saving the appearances’. He is satisfied 
that these different kinds of ‘motion’ reproduce the appearance of planetary orbits as 
obtained from observational data. But Copernicus is not concerned with the further 
question whether either of these different geometric techniques may be a better way of 
modelling the kinematics of planetary motions. Of these different models he says: ‘I 
could not really say which one is right.’ (Copernicus1543, Bk. III, §20; cf. §15) Nor is he 
concerned with establishing whether these geometric devices can be regarded as a 
physical explanation of the apparent motion of the planets. Kepler later complained 
that his predecessors had sought the ‘equipollence of their hypotheses with the 
Ptolemaic system’. (Kepler 1618-21, Bk. IV, Pt. II, §5)Kepler went on to investigate 
‘physical’ causes of planetary motion – a process during which he abandoned many of 
the ideas still important to Copernicus. 
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Figure I: EccentricMotion. 
Explanation of apparent 
non-uniform motion on the 
assumption of uniform 
motion. The sun moves 
uniformly around point 
(Ecc).  Seen from the Earth 
(E), however, the uniform 
motion looks non-uniform. 
At positon 1 the Sun appears 
furthest away from the 
Earth (apogee), while at 
position 2, it appears at its 
closest approach to the 
Earth (perigee). 
As we shall see the equivalence of hypotheses is one of the central pillars of Leibniz’s 
philosophy, which he deploys in his defence of the Copernican hypothesis. But Leibniz 
stood in the tradition of an evolved Keplerian version of Copernicanism. Like Kepler, he 
also appeals to dynamic notions to argue his case in favour of the Copernican 
‘hypothesis’.  
 Copernicus was still committed to the Greek ideal of circular motion for planetary 
orbits. To be precise, Copernicus believed that planets were carried on spheres, which 
themselves performed circular motion around a centre. (See Barker 1990; 2002) The 
title of his book refers to the ‘revolutions of heavenly spheres’. He tells his readers that  
the movement of the celestial bodies is circular. For the motion of a sphere is to turn in a 
circle (…). (Copernicus 1543, Book I, §4; cf. Book VI, §§1-2). 2 
In early Greek geocentric astronomy the centre coincided with the position of the 
Earth. But a simple homocentric model of planetary motion, according to which the 
planets orbit the central Earth on concentric rings, fails to match the observations. 
Planets move at varying speeds and distances from the central body and sometimes 
                                                          
2
 The original title of Copernicus’s book was changed from De Revolutionibus orbium mundi to De 
Revolutionibus orbium caelestium in order to avoid the disapproval of the Church. 
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Figure II: Epicyclic Motion. Retrograde motion, as 
seen from the Earth, occurs, when the planet 
moves from P1 to P2 on its epicycle. 
seem to go into retrograde motion. Retrograde motion is the apparent periodic 
westward deviation of planets, as seen from Earth, from their normal eastward motion. 
Various devices were introduced to cope with this difficulty. (Figure II) In order to 
improve the accuracy of his geocentric model even further, in particular with respect to 
retrograde motion, Ptolemy introduced a new device: the equant (Figure III), which was 
meant to explain more precisely the retrograde motion of the planets. Copernicus 
strongly objected to the use of the equant because it violated the ideal of uniform 
circular motion. Although Copernicus puts the mean sun at the centre of his heliocentric 
model, he admits only circular motion, which forces him to apply minor epicycles to 
improve the ‘fit’ between his model and the apparent motion of the planets. 
 
 Copernicus lacks dynamic concepts like inertia and gravity, which were needed to 
advance towards a physical explanation of planetary orbits. Copernicus possessed no 
modern concept of lawful physical behaviour, no notion of laws of science as quantified 
functional relationships between various physical parameters. The lack of these tools 
meant that Copernicus had to content himself with the geometry of kinematic 
relationships, like his Greek predecessors. When Kepler broke with the presupposition 
of circular motion, abandoned the idea of ‘celestial spheres’ and replaced geometry 
with mathematical analysis, which permitted him to establish the three laws of 
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Figure III: The Equant. Explanation of retrograde motion with a new geometric device, the 
equant. (See Copernicus 1543, Bk. III, §15-6; Ptolemy 1984, §IX.6; Andersen/Barker/Chen 
2006, Ch. 6.3) This representation is supposed to be a closer fit of the model to the data 
than the elementary homocentric model. From the point of view of the equant, the 
motion of the planet on the epicycle would appear uniform. Further flexibility is 
introduced by letting the Earth either sit at the Centre of the deferent or off-centre, as 
indicated in the diagram. 
planetary motion, he went a significant step beyond the Copernican model of 
heliocentrism. In particular, Kepler began to think of the physical causes of planetary 
motion and thus introduced dynamic considerations. For these reasons, Kepler is 
regarded as the true revolutionary in astronomy. Leibniz, too, stood in the Keplerian 
tradition since he invented, independently of Newton, the differential calculus and 
proposed a vortex theory (1689) to account for the Keplerian non-circular orbits of the 
planets. 
 Modern defenders of the computational equivalence of the geocentric and heliocentric 
models could add a further argument to their case by considering the explanation of the 
seasons on the two models. On the geocentric view the seasons are a result of a tilt of 
the eccentric, ecliptic circle by 23.5º with respect to the plane of the stationary Earth. 
The tilt of the ecliptic circle explains the sun’s variation in latitude in different locations 
around the globe. The explanation ismore cumbersome on the Copernican model. 
Copernicus naturally stipulates that the Earth is tilted at the same degree with respect 
to the solar plane. [Copernicus 1543, Bk. I, §2, §11] But Copernicus introduces a third 
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motion to the Earth, which he calls the ‘deflexion of the axis of the moving Earth.’ This 
movement can be visualized as a wobble in the Earth’s axis in its orbit around the sun. 
The third motion (in addition to the daily and annual motion) has the function of 
explaining the change of seasons. This ‘deflexion’ is necessitated by the Copernican 
assumption that planets are not free-moving in space but are attached to spheres, 
which serve as their orbital vehicles. This means that the Earth’s axis shifts its 
orientation in the annual orbit around the sun. As Kepler abandons the spheres, on 
which the planets are carried in the Copernican model, he is able to dispense with the 
third motion of the Earth. The axis of inclination remains constant with respect to the 
plane of the orbit around the sun. The Keplerian model of free-moving planets and a 
constant tilt of the Earth’s axis with respect to the ecliptic are sufficient to explain the 
seasons. 
Leibniz was aware of the developments in astronomy from the original Copernican to the 
later Keplerian, Cartesian and Newtonian versions of the theory. Leibniz was equally aware 
of the philosophical discussions surrounding the epistemological status of the heliocentric 
‘hypothesis’: was it to be understood as a mere calculating device, in the instrumentalist 
fashion, or as a realist claim about the planetary system? Leibniz did not follow Kepler and 
Copernicus’s only ‘pupil’ Rheticus in embracing a realist reading of the Copernican 
hypothesis. He not simply ignores the instrumentalist reading, which as reflected in Leibniz’s 
writings, was still a viable option in his own time. As we shall see, the principle of the 
equivalence of hypotheses does not offer sufficient ground to declare the heliocentric 
hypothesis the clear winner in the dispute with the geocentric hypothesis. A realist or 
instrumentalist reading of the Copernican model depended on an understanding of the 
notion of ‘hypothesis’ in the 16th and 17th century. In order to explain Leibniz’s defence of 
the Copernican model, we need to understand the career of the notion of ‘hypothesis’ and 
its changing connotation during the crucial period from 1543-1687, a period which is 
nowadays dubbed the ‘Scientific Revolution’. 
3. On Hypotheses 
Newton is famous for his statement: ‘Hypotheses non fingo.’ This Latin phrase can be 
rendered alternatively as ‘I do not feign hypotheses’; ‘I do not make use of fictions’; ‘I do not 
 
13 
 
use false propositions or premises or explanations.’3 Historians of science have identified 
several senses in which Newton uses the word ‘hypothesis.’ Sometimes he meant a 
plausible though not provable conception. In his later years he came to regard a hypothesis 
as a gratuitous fiction. (Koyré 1965, 36-7) 
That which cannot be derived from phenomena is called a hypothesis and these do not 
belong to experimental philosophy. (Quoted in Dijksterhuis 1956, 537; Burtt 1924, 215-20) 
Newton was not the first scientist to worry about the term ‘hypothesis’; the worry reaches 
back to the Greeks. The concern is about whether the geometric constructions, with which 
the Greeks attempted to explain the appearances, i.e. the observable behaviour of the 
planets, including the retrograde and non-uniform motion around the centre, have to be 
regarded as fiction or reality. This uncertainty about astronomical hypotheses is reflected in 
the attitudes of Aristotle and Ptolemy. Aristotle adopted a much more realist attitude than 
Ptolemy since he considered that his homocentric spheres, which carried the planets around 
their circular orbits, actually existed in nature. But his homocentric model cannot be correct 
because it fails to account for the ‘appearances’ – the variation in brightness of the planets 
and their temporary retrogression. In order to account for the observations, Ptolemy 
introduced his geometric devices (epicycles, eccentrics, equants, which made sense of the 
observations) but at the price of abandoning Aristotelian realism. Ptolemy adopted an 
instrumentalist attitude towards his geometric devices as useful fictions, which made sense 
of the observations, but he did not expect his geometric models to properly represent the 
celestial phenomena. (Ptolemy 1948, 600-1) 
The contrast between instrumentalism (or fictionalism) and realism shaped the discussion of 
astronomers well beyond the death of Copernicus in 1543. (Cf. Donahue 1975; Westman 
1975a)Duhem (1908: Chapt. 4) holds the view that this contrast – and the desire to 
overcome it – lay at the root of Copernicus’s reform of astronomy. (An alternative, more 
technical reason, is that Copernicus was disturbed by Ptolemy’s equant and wished to 
return to truly circular motion. Cf. Wilson 1975)Copernicus and his pupil Rheticus had 
corresponded about the usefulness of hypotheses in astronomy with the Lutheran 
theologian Andreas Osiander (1498-1552), who also adopted an instrumentalist 
                                                          
3
Koyré (1965), 35; Dijksterhuis (1956), 541; Crombie distinguishes 3 senses of ‘hypotheses’: improvised 
propositions, heuristic aids, illegitimate fictions; Crombie (1994), Vol. II, 1071 
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interpretation of the Copernican hypothesis in order to protect his book from a ‘realist’ 
misinterpretation at the hand of a hostile clergy. (Cf. Wrightsman 1975) Copernicus and his 
pupil considered that certain astronomical hypotheses were more probable than others. 
More probability accrued to the heliocentric hypothesis than to the geocentric hypothesis, 
in view of the observations. Acceptable hypotheses in astronomy had to explain all the 
observable phenomena. They had to explain the phenomena in a coherent way. The 
Ptolemaic hypothesis, says Rheticus, does not suffice to establish the harmony of celestial 
phenomena. (Rheticus 1540, 132; see also Correspondence reprinted in Rosen 1959, 31-2; 
1984, 125-6, 193-4, 198-205) Kepler later agreed that the Copernican hypothesis enjoyed 
more probability than the Ptolemaic hypothesis.  The notion of hypothesis had great 
repercussions throughout the next 140 years. The ambiguity of the term as reflected in 
Newton’s views on hypotheses in science, invited opposing interpretations of the 
Copernican model. In his Dialogue Concerning The Two Chief World Systems (1632), Galileo 
epitomizes the ambivalent status of hypotheses in the 16th and 17th century. The Preface 
states that his spokesman, Salviati, will defend the Copernican system but only as a purely 
mathematical hypothesis. But as the dialogue unfolds, Salviati is drawn towards probability 
arguments. Eventually he adopts the Copernican position that the acceptance of the dual 
motion of the Earth as a physical assumption leads to a more coherent explanation of the 
appearances. Note that these probability arguments invoke belief in a model, because its 
physical assumptions are more probable. It is not believable, says Kepler, that the ‘fixed 
stars move at incalculable speed’, whilst the Earth stands still. It is more probable that the 
apparent daily rotation of the fixed stars is an effect of the rotating Earth.4   (Kepler 1618-
21, Pt. II, §5) The Copernican hypotheses are more like conjectures than useful fictions. They 
                                                          
4
 Kepler’s probability argument states that we should attach more plausibility to the heliocentric view because 
the evidence - the apparent motion of the ‘fixed’ stars in a 24-hour-rhythm about the earth – is more probable 
on the view that the earth rotates on its own axis. These probability arguments can be supported by a 
consideration of the angular velocities involved under the two scenarios. Under some simplifying assumptions, 
the angular velocity of the rotating earth for an observer at the equator is h
km
s
m 1670464  . The geocentric 
view, by contrast, has to assume an angular velocity of the ‘fixed’ stars about the stationary earth. A 
calculation produces a value of h
km
s
m 76 1096.11045.5  . It is such an enormous rotational velocity of the 
stars – 19.6 million kilometres per hour, compared to 1670 km per hour for the earth at the equator – which 
the Copernicans consider implausible on mechanical grounds.  By comparison, the orbital velocity of the earth 
around the sun is 30km/s and the velocity of the sun around the galactic centre is 225km/s. The evidence – the 
apparent rotation of the sphere of fixed stars – is more likely on account of heliocentrism than on account of 
geocentrism. (See Weinert 2010) 
 
15 
 
have a much closer association with the phenomena than Newton would later accept. They 
form, as Rheticus tells us, the basis of inferences.  
By contrast, labelling hypotheses as ‘useful fictions’ in astronomy had, according to 
Osiander, certain advantages. It reassured Copernicus’s adversaries that his heliocentric 
model did not force them to abandon their cherished geocentric beliefs. Cardinal Bellarmine 
reminded Galileo that Copernicus had always spoken hypothetically: it is possible to use the 
motion of the Earth as a mathematical device to render the calculations more economic, 
since fewer epicycles and eccentrics are needed. However to affirm the centrality of the sun 
as a physical hypothesis is in conflict with the Scriptures.5 
In order to avoida clash between the Church and heliocentrism, Osiander inserts his Preface 
in an attempt to present the Copernican hypotheses as mere calculating devices. They have 
the license to be false or replaceable as long as ‘they reproduce exactly the phenomena of 
the motions.’ (Osiander1541) By the time Newton appeared on the scene, and in the wake 
of Kepler’s work, hypotheses had lost their appeal. Newton declared that the laws of motion 
are deduced from Phenomena and made general by Induction, and this is the highest 
evidence that a proposition can have in Philosophy. (Koyré 1965, 36-7; Dijksterhuis 1956, 
544, 546-7) Phenomena are (reliable) observational or experimental data, from which are 
derived laws or axioms. Newton rejects any explanation of natural phenomena, which 
appeals to ‘metaphysical’ hypotheses, for which no evidence can be cited. It was against this 
historical backdrop that Leibniz took up his defence in support of heliocentrism (1689). 
Copernicus still used the term ‘hypothesis’ quite freely in his De Revolutionibus. The Greeks, 
he says, reserved the term ‘hypothesis’ for ‘principles and assumptions.’ Throughout his 
work Copernicus calls the motion of the Earth a ‘hypothesis’. He does not mean it in 
Newton’s pejorative sense. Copernicus is a realist about the motion of the Earth and the 
spatial distribution of the planets around the sun. But Copernicus is not a realist about the 
geometric devices, which he and his Greek predecessors employed to ‘save the 
phenomena’. As mentioned above, Copernicus accepts the ‘equipollence of hypotheses’, as 
had his Greek predecessors. Thus he declares that the apparent irregular motion of the 
                                                          
5
 See Koestler (1959), 454; similar statements, reflecting Osiander’s instrumentalist attitude, are found in Kuhn 
(1957), 191, 194; Crombie (1994), Vol. I, 599-600 
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planets can either be accounted for by the use of an eccentric circle, i.e. one whose ‘centre 
is not the centre of the sun’ or through an epicycle on a homocentric circle’ (a deferent). 
(Copernicus 1543: 151) ‘Accordingly, it is not easy to determine which of them exists in the 
heavens.’ (Copernicus 1543: 154) By contrast Kepler aims to practice astronomy without the 
use of ‘hypotheses’, since he is interested in the physical causes of planetary motion. 
It can easily do without the useless furniture of fictitious circles and spheres. But there is 
such a great need of imagining the true figures, in which the routes of the planets are 
arranged, that we are impoverishing Astronomy and that the big job to be worked on by the 
true astronomer is to demonstrate from observations what figures the planetary orbits 
possess; and to devise such hypotheses, or physical principles, as can be used to 
demonstrate the figures which are in accord with the deductions made from observations. 
(Kepler 1618-21: 124) 
Kepler goes beyond Copernicus by moving from kinematics to dynamics. This distinction 
between a kinematic description and a dynamic explanation of planetary motion becomes 
important in the defence of Copernicanism. When Leibniz took up this challenge, he 
employed two of his most fundamental principles – the relativity of motion and the 
equivalence of hypotheses. Strictly speaking these two principles will not deliver a decisive 
defence of Copernicanism since by the verdict of these two principles astronomical 
phenomena could be explained equivalently by the geocentric or the heliocentric 
hypothesis. As indicated above, the seasons can either be explained by the assumption that 
the path of the sun around the central Earth is inclined by 23.5 with respect to the plane of 
the Earth or by the assumption of an orbiting Earth whose axis of rotation is inclined by the 
same angle with respect to the stars. In the face of the equivalence of hypotheses Leibniz 
appeals to other criteria - like simplicity, intelligibility, probability - to argue in favour of an 
elimination of geocentrism. Above all, however, it is his attempt at a dynamic explanation of 
Keplerian elliptical orbits, which renders his case in favour of the Copernican hypothesis 
much more solid than a mere reliance on his kinematic principles.6 
IV. Leibniz’s Defence of Heliocentrism 
                                                          
6
 It is interesting to note that this ambivalent attitude towards hypothesis survived the consolidation of 
Newtonian heliocentrism. L. Boltzmann (1844-1906), for instance, calls hypotheses ‘arbitrary pictures’ 
(Boltzmann 1974, 161), whilst E. Mach (1838-1916) regards hypotheses as thought constructs, which aid the 
economy of thought. (Mach 1883: 468) Duhem himself concludes his survey of astronomy (1908) with a 
general plea for instrumentalism in science. 
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Galileo introduced into physics the principle of the relativity of motion. According to the 
principle of relativity, the kinetic motion of an object can be described from either a 
stationary or a moving reference frame. As long as the motion is inertial (either at rest or 
moving at constant velocity) both views are equivalent. They must lead to the same 
numerical results. It is a matter of choice, which system we regard as the frame at rest and 
the frame in motion, respectively. This makes no difference to the physics of the situation. 
Galileo offers a famous thought experiment to demonstrate the equivalence of inertial 
systems. In a cabin below the deck of a large ship observe the behaviour of ‘flies’, other 
‘small winged creatures’ and ‘fish in a bowl’. At first the ship is at rest. When the first set of 
observations is completed, let the ship proceed with uniform speed. The observations will 
reveal no difference in the behaviour of the creatures. (Galileo 1953, 199-201) 
 
Leibniz was obviously aware of the Galilean relativity principle, since he employs a Galilean-
type thought experiment against absolute motion. The principles of the relativity of motion 
and the equivalence of hypotheses are closely related. In fact, the (Galilean) relativity of 
motion implies the equivalence of hypotheses, as Leibniz observed in his Specimen 
Dynamicum (1695, 445; italics in original): 
Therefore we must hold that if any number of bodies are in motion, we cannot determine from the 
phenomena which of them are in absolute determinate motion or rest; rest can be attributed to any 
one of them you may choose, and yet the same phenomena will be produced. It follows therefore 
(Descartes did not notice this) that the equivalence of hypotheses is not changed by the impact of 
bodies upon each other and that such rules of motion must be set up that the relative nature of 
motion is saved (…).  
Leibniz applies this reasoning to Copernicus. But it raises the question whether one of the 
hypotheses may be said to be more probable than its rival. Leibniz deploys the criterion of 
simplicity: 
That is to say, if the given phenomena appear the same, whatever may be the true hypothesis or 
however we may ascribe motion or rest to them, the same result will be produced in the unknown or 
the resulting phenomena, even with respect to the action of bodies upon each other. This conforms 
to our experience; we feel the same pain whether our hand strikes a stone which is at rest (…) or the 
stones strikes our hand at rest with the same velocity. Meanwhile we speak as the situation 
demands, in whatever way provides the more fitting and simpler explanation of the phenomena, just 
as we make use of the motion of a primum mobile in the study of spheres and must use the 
Copernican hypothesis in planetary theory. (Leibniz 1695, 445-6; italics in original) 
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Nevertheless, from the point of view of (Galilean) relativity it makes no difference whether 
we adopt a geocentric or a heliocentric view.7 (Solla Price 1962, 198; Rosen 1984, 183-4) We 
can follow Ptolemy: regard the Earth as a stationary frame and the sun as a moving frame. 
Or we can follow Copernicus: regard the Earth as a moving frame and the sun as a stationary 
frame. According to the principle of relativity our choice makes no difference to the physics 
of the situation.  As Leibniz says, so it appears to be. The Earth turns on its own axis once in 
a 24-hour rhythm to give us day and night. If the sun turned around the stationary Earth 
once in a 24-hour rhythm it would give us day and night. The seasons result from either a 
tilted plane of the sun around the Earth or a tilted orbit of the Earth around the sun. 
However there is more to a description of the solar system than mere kinematics. From a 
strictly kinematic point of view, the models are equivalent. The kinematic point of view is 
only concerned with pure motion, without regard to its causes. (Dijksterhuis 1956, I, §83; IV, 
§18, IV, C) This is the Ptolemaic and Copernican perspective.  But there is also the question 
of dynamics: What causes the planetary bodies to move? Consider a slightly amended 
version of Leibniz’s example: the encounter of a hand with a wall. Whether we regard the 
hand or the wall as being at rest, we experience the same pain. Physics informs us that both 
can be regarded as reference frame either at rest or in motion. The kinematics will be the 
same. But experience also tells us that the hand is more likely to move than the wall. The 
dynamic situation is no longer equivalent. The body causes the hand to move. The wall has 
no cause of motion.  Kepler was preoccupied with the question of physical causes. He 
suspected that energetic rays from the sun drove the Earth around its elliptical orbit. When 
a planet shows its ‘friendly face’ to the sun, its magnetic lines attract it. When a planet 
shows its ‘unfriendly face’ to the sun, its magnetic lines repulse it. The game of attraction 
and repulsion constrains the planet to its orbital motion around the sun. (Kepler 1618-21, 
Pt. II, §93) As Newton later showed, this dynamic explanation was mistaken. Nevertheless, 
Kepler advanced dynamic arguments in favour of the orbital motion of the Earth. Once 
Newton showed why the planets stay in their elliptical orbits around the sun, the 
heliocentric model gave a better representation of physical reality than the geocentric 
                                                          
7
 Galilean relativity only applies to inertial motion. Einstein’s general principle of relativity applies to both 
inertial and non-inertial motion. In General relativity it is possible to distinguish inertial from accelerated 
motion by observing the geometry of world-lines. (Thanks to an anonymous referee who suggested a 
clarification on this point.) 
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model. Newton improved the mathematical structure of the model. He provided a dynamic 
explanation of planetary orbits in a heliocentric model.  
It seems at first that the central message of his essay ‘On Copernicanism and the Relativity 
of Motion’ (1689) is the equivalence of hypotheses. Leibniz affirms once again that ‘motion 
is not something absolute, but consists in a relation.’ (Leibniz 1689a, 91) Hence 
an astronomer makes no greater mistake by explaining the theory of the planets in accordance with 
the Tychonic hypothesis than he would make by using the Copernican hypothesis in teaching 
spherical astronomy and explaining day and night, thereby burdening the student with unnecessary 
difficulties. (Leibniz 1689a,91) 
Adopting a criterion of simplicity, the Copernican account is the ‘truest theory’, that is, the 
most intelligible one, since it avoids the ‘perplexities’ (like retrograde motion) with which 
other theories are burdened. In a letter of 1688, Leibniz calls the Copernican hypothesis 
‘confirmed by (…) many arguments drawn from new discoveries. (Quoted in Meli 1988, 21) 
The truth of a hypothesis is nothing but its intelligibility.  (Leibniz 1689a, 91; cf. Lodge 2003) 
For if the truth of a hypothesis lies in its intelligibility and the Copernican hypothesis has 
‘greater intelligibility’ than the geocentric hypothesis,  
(…) there would be no more distinction between those who prefer the Copernican system as 
the hypothesis more in agreement with the intellect, and those who defend it as the truth. 
For the nature of the matter is that the two claims are identical; nor should one look for a 
greater or a different truth here. And since it is permissible to present the Copernican system 
as the simpler hypothesis, it would also be permissible to teach it as the truth in this 
particular sense. (Leibniz 1689a,92) 
On this understanding astronomers need not hold back ‘by the fear of censure.’ By adopting 
this approach, Leibniz hopes to ‘free Rome and Italy from the slander that great and 
beautiful truths are there suppressed.’ (Leibniz 1689a,93) But is Leibniz not adopting 
Osiander’s instrumentalist attitude? After all, Ptolemy already believed that his theory of 
eccentrics, epicycles and equants provided the simplest devices to account for the 
phenomena, without believing in their reality. Yet Ptolemy added that the hypotheses 
should only be as simple as to allow them to save the phenomena as accurately as possible. 
(Duhem 1908: Chapt. 3) Osiander, too, recommends the Copernican hypothesis for its 
simplicity and greater intelligibility, without admitting any correspondence to reality.  
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A closer reading, however, reveals that Leibniz goes well beyond Ptolemy’s and Osiander’s 
instrumentalism. In his Specimen Dynamicum (1689) Leibniz concludes his remarks on 
Copernicanism with an observation, which will allow him to express a preference for one of 
the competing hypotheses, not offered by the relativity of motion and the principle of 
simplicity.  
But whenever the equipollence of hypotheses is involved, every factor contributing to the phenomena 
must be included. (Leibniz 1695,450) 
Equally, ‘truth is found not so much in phenomena as in their causes.’ (Leibniz 1695: 446) As 
we shall see now these additional factors are the dynamics of planetary motions. The 
equivalence of hypotheses shows that all hypotheses are equally possible but dynamics 
demonstrates that not all hypotheses are equally probable. Thus, it is more probable that 
the appearance of certain celestial motions, like the 24-hour rotation of the fixed stars is the 
result of the Earth’s motion on its own axis.  
The criteria of intelligibility and simplicity cannot be decisive in moving from an 
instrumentalist to a realist position, for Leibniz concedes that ‘the Ptolemaic account is the 
truest one in spherical astronomy.’ The simplest hypothesis is not necessarily the true one – 
contrary to what Leibniz writes to Huygens in September 1694 (Leibniz 1690b,308) – for 
Ptolemy also appealed to the criterion of simplicity, whilst adopting an instrumentalist 
position regarding his geometric devices. There must be other reasons to prefer the 
Copernican hypothesis. Leibniz writes to Huygens in June 1694 that ‘other than extension 
and its variations, which are purely geometric things, we must acknowledge something 
higher, namely force.’ (Leibniz 1690b, 308) In other words, there are additional criteria to 
judge astronomical hypotheses, in particular dynamical reasons.  
Although Leibniz was aware of Newton’s theory of gravitation, he was dissatisfied with 
Newton’s account and attempted his own mechanical explanation of planetary motions by 
way of a vortex theory. He hints at it in his paper on Copernicanism (1689): Kepler’s laws, he 
claims, can be given a physical explanation ‘by means of a vortex around the sun.’ (Leibniz 
1689a,93) He divides planetary trajectories into two components: a) harmonic circulation 
and b) paracentric motion. 
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And thus we may consider a planet to be moved by a two-fold motion, or composed from the 
harmonic circulation of the orbit of its carrying fluid, and from a paracentric motion, as if of a certain 
weight or an attraction, that is an impulse towards the sun, or the primary planet.  
(…) the paracentric motion of the planets is required to be explained, arising from the force of the 
circulation on a planet being made to change orbit, and composed from the attraction between itself 
and the sun. (Leibniz 1689b, §§8-9) 
The sun is compared to a magnet, as in Kepler’s dynamical explanations, but in order to 
account for the stability of the elliptical orbits, in agreement with Kepler’s laws, Leibniz 
stipulates that paracentric motion consists of an attracting and a receding part, with respect 
to the sun. (Leibniz 1689b, §27) During its harmonic circulation the planet at first falls 
towards the sun and is then repelled by the magnetic force. With his attempted solution 
Leibniz stands more in the tradition of Kepler and Descartes than in the footsteps of 
Newton, whose solution appeared at the same time. But it is clear that Leibniz is at pains to 
formulate his causal theory of planetary motion in such a way that it is in accordance with 
Kepler’s laws. (Leibniz 1690b,309-11; Leibniz 1689b) By contrast both Galileo and Descartes 
ignored Kepler’s laws. (See Schmaltz 2015) 
By accepting Kepler’s laws of planetary motion, Leibniz accepts the Copernican system as a 
reality, since Kepler’s laws take the sun as a focal point of planetary orbits. He also 
dispenses with epicycles and eccentrics, in line with Kepler’s stipulation. The relativity of 
motion only applies to kinematics, proved through geometrical demonstrations’ (Leibniz 
1689a, 92) But Kepler’s laws require a physical explanation. Whilst Leibniz attempts such a 
dynamic explanation in terms of Cartesian vortex theory, the Newtonian way is to derive 
these laws from the laws of motion. Leibniz’s vortex theory suffered the same fate as its 
Cartesian cousin. Irrespective of the inadequacy of the vortex theory, from the dynamical 
point of view Leibniz’s defence of the Copernican hypothesis looks considerably stronger 
than Osiander’s instrumentalist approach. For the equivalence of hypotheses does not 
bestow a greater degree of credibility on the rival hypothesis; and the simplicity of a 
hypothesis is relative to background knowledge. In theory, Aristotle’s homocentric circles 
are simpler than Ptolemy’s geometric devices but not in view of the observable appearance 
of planetary motion. 
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Dynamic causes, however, allow a much stronger defence of the Copernican hypothesis, 
since they can be coupled with probability considerations. Some causes are more probable 
than others: the hand is more likely to move than the wall. Leibniz even claims that the 
‘magnetic properties’, which planets like the Earth, Jupiter and Saturn ‘exert’ on their 
respective moons, as well as the natural explanation of retrograde motion, constitute 
confirmation of the Copernican view.  (Leibniz 1689a, 93) He could have derived even 
stronger evidence from Galileo’s observations of the phases of Venus or the bounded 
elongation of inferior planets. 
5. Conclusion 
It looks at first as if Leibniz offered only a guarded defence of the Copernican hypothesis: a) 
the relativity of motion and the equivalence of hypotheses do not allow him a stronger 
stance; b) he wants to protect the reputation of the Catholic Church, which would only 
allow an instrumentalist interpretation (as expressed by Osiander and Bellarmine); c) 
nevertheless, the Copernican hypothesis can be regarded as more intelligible than the 
Ptolemaic one.  
The greater intelligibility of the Copernican hypothesis is revealed, despite the equivalence 
of hypotheses, by its greater simplicity.  It should be added that it is only simpler than 
Ptolemy in its Keplerian form for it dispenses with Copernican epicycles and spheres. It is 
the Keplerian version of heliocentrism, which Leibniz defends. It is also revealed by the 
dynamic reasons – the vortex theory – at which Leibniz hints in his paper on Copernicanism 
and which he spells out in greater detail in his letter to Huygens (1690) and his Tentamen 
(1689). Although the vortex explanation does not succeed, it reveals that Leibniz was eager 
to provide a causal theory which respected Kepler’s laws. The sun does not exert a magnetic 
attraction on the planet but a gravitational force. What matters, however, is that Leibniz 
goes beyond kinematics towards dynamics. It is the dynamic reasons, which ultimately 
provide the best defence of heliocentrism. 
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